Renegade Third Worlder

Dissuading the West from joining our lowly club of nations

Category: Immigration (page 1 of 2)

The truth about Simón Bolívar

Pol Victoria was recently interviewed by Intereconomía about that not-so-well-known side of the history of Simón Bolívar.

[I submitted English subtitles to their YouTube channel. However, as their review will probably take a couple days before publishing them, I am leaving the caption file below.]

Caption file:

Drawing on the work of historian Pablo Victoria (no relation to Pol Victoria), Victoria walks viewers through a series of troubling facts that are utterly at odds with the perennial legend of Bolívar as El Libertador [The Liberator] of peoples oppressed by an evil Spanish empire.

Rather, Bolívar’s so-called “war of independence” could better be described as a civil war between two factions of Spanish creoles: those who favored Spanish rule (the Realists), and those who, under Bolívar’s leadership, opposed it.

Bolivar was, of course, inspired by the ideas of the Enlightenment as much as any member of the Jacobin Club during the French revolution. And the fanatic zeal with which he pursued those ideals was also on a par with those who implemented them in France:

  • In what today is Venezuela, Bolívar declared war to the death against the Realsits, and he carried it out with full force.
  • After the battle of El Tinaquillo, in August, 1813, he razed a series of towns, and kills all the “Europeans and Canarians,” as he called the Realists.
  • In September that same year he implemented forcible conscription, and shot those who refused to take arms.
  • Immediately after that, he shot 69 Spanyards without trial.
  • In December, 1813, he defeats the weakened Realist army at Acarigua, and orders the execution of 600 prisoners.
  • On February 8, 1814, he goes after Spanish prisoners held at Caracas, Valencia and La Guaira. They were approximately 1,200 civilians, most of them retail traders, and immediately orders the shooting of all Spanyards among the prisoners as well as those in the hospital, without exceptions. Because gunpowder was scarce, they were executed with swords and pikes, and to finish them off, they crushed their skulls using large rocks.
  • The elderly and disabled were taken to the gallows tied up to their chairs.
  • Despite the supplications of Caracas’ archbishop, Bolivar carried out the killings.
  • The last report of the butchering shows that the sick in the hospitals were also executed.
  • There was also the killing of the shipwrecks of a Spanish boat at Margarita island, the criminal looting of Santa Fe, and the killing of prisoners after the Boyacá battle.
  • When Bolivar comes back to Caracas after his victory, the first ones to rebel against him were the slaves in his own haciendas. They thought they were much better off living under Spanish rule than under cruel, blood-thirsty, fanatical zealot.

Understanding Bolívar’s true character and motivations is also crucial for understanding the utter failure of Latin America as the prototypical multicultural project. For only a Utopian fanatic like Bolívar would dare carrying it out.

As much as Bolívar was very much aware of the impossibility of unbridled democracy to function in the simmering cauldron of races that were the territories he liberated, he thought all he needed to do to make his revolutionary dream come true was a little institutional fine-tuning here and there.

But his attempt to implement liberal ideals in a top-down fashion through a centralist state, through what has been described as a model of “enlightened absolutism,” finally blew up in his face.

By 1830, reality finally dawned on him, and on his way to exile, he gravely declared:

‘I have ruled for 20 years and from these I have gained only a few certainties:
America is ungovernable, for us;
Those who serve a revolution plough the sea;
The only thing one can do in America is emigrate;
This country will fall inevitably into the hands of the unbridled masses and then pass almost imperceptibly into the hands of petty tyrants, of all colours and races;
Once we have been devoured by every crime and extinguished by utter ferocity, the Europeans will not even regard us as worth conquering;
If it were possible for any part of the world to revert to primitive chaos, it would be America in its final hour.’

Needless to say, Bolívar’s true legacy is, more than ever, of great interest for understanding today’s tumultuous political situation in the West.

The utter failure of Latin America as a multicultural project is the direct consequence of his political legacy, and is a dire warning to those still under the globalist spell who harbor any hope that diversity can, somehow, be a strength.

Race, culture, and labor market integration in Norway

A recent Norwegian study shows how difficult it is for migrants to find a sustainable source of income:

The main message coming out of our longitudinal analyses is that the labor market integration of immigrants from low‐income countries tends to lose steam after just a few years in Norway, and that the integration process then goes into reverse. After five to ten years of residence, virtually all immigrant groups from low‐income countries – regardless of gender and admission class – experience declining employment rates and increasing social insurance dependency rates relative to natives with shared characteristics.

Interesting as it is, let us draw that other conclusion that the authors, as usual, simply turn a blind eye to:

Whites are much more likely to integrate than non-whites.

As the following table shows, migrants from Bosnia and Kosovo are clearly better able to keep jobs and avoid welfare than migrants from Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, and Somalia (Afghan males are more likely to keep jobs and less dependent on welfare than male Bosnians and Kosovars, but the pattern is reversed for Afghan females):

Just as obvious, all the countries in the list are predominantly Muslim. This is consistent with the fact that Muslim migrants tend to become more radicalized over time, and seems to support the notion that other things being equal, whiteness is a strong determinant of ease of integration among migrants.

Liberal confusion, populism edition

Over at Amerika, Brett Stevens, commenting on an article on populism in Foreign Affairs, articulates a neat, crystal clear definition of the term:

…populism recognizes the nature of power, which is to use institutions to limit the organic nation and parasitize it for the benefit of international elites and home-grown toadies.

It is “populist” only in that it is meta-democracy, or a popular sentiment created outside the controlled confines of courts, voting and public discourse. It is a cultural wave pushing back against how politics frames the narrative and artificially limits choices based on the pretense of people in groups.

Where conservatives think we can import people from the third world, “educate” them in our ways and have them live among us, the Alt Right realizes that diversity as a whole fails. Where Nazis single out African-Americans and Jews, the Alt Right points out that every group acts in its own self-interest alone, and in the Machiavellian realpolitik and so ideas like “we are all one” and diversity can never work no matter what groups are involved.

Populists also recognize the nation as an organic entity, or a people. This means that it only lasts so long as its founding group remains unmixed and with its traditions intact. To a populist, social standards must be enforced by culture, and having government step in the way makes government into a parasitic and corrupting force.

Since the adoption of liberalism in the West, a process that took over a thousand years, we have become materialistic or focused on material goals instead of doing what is right. That includes deference to institutions like law and politics, a facilitative society that aims at empowering individual choice over commonality of purpose, and the mentality that whatever is profitable, popular or socially trending is more important that doing what is good, beautiful and true according to the order of nature.

The pushback began once it became clear that Leftists had buried our society in so many rules and precedents that any action except moar Leftism was demonized, ostracized and made politically incorrect…

It is important to define the term as precisely as possible, because its use and abuse is one of the liberal elite’s favorite rhetorical weapons in the culture wars.

The most Orwellian version of this exercise claims that populism necessarily leads to Latin-American-style authoritarianism.

A few recent examples:

How to be a poulist,” by Moises Naim for The Atlantic

Insult, provoke, repeat: how Donald Trump became America’s Hugo Chávez,” by Rory Carroll for The Guardian.

Populism: The new enemy of democracy,” by Nobel Laureate Mario Vargas Llosa for El Pais.

What Trump has in common with Hugo Chavez,” by Andres Oppenheimer for The Miami Herald.

Donald Trump is no Hugo Chavez. He is more like Nicolas Maduro,” by Francisco Toro for The Washington Post.

Don’t cry for me, America: Forget the wall. Donald Trump’s appeal is textbook Latin American populism,” by Enrique Krauze for Slate.

Beware, liberal bien-pensants say, of leaders who appeal to the deepest, gut-level political instincts of the common folk, pitting them against an oppressive, corrupt, establishment-entrenched elite: that’s exactly what the likes of Hugo Chávez did in Venezuela… and look how their common folk ended up!

The outrageous fallacy, of course, resides in the fact that the deepest, gut-level political instincts of a people are as good as a people’s culture. Which in turn is an emergent, path-dependent property of those people’s idiosyncratic matrix of predispositions, beliefs, behaviors, temperaments and aptitudes with which they are endowed by their genes.

As much as Marxist class-warfare demagoguery as championed by the likes of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez use populist discourse to pit the common guy against the establishment, its inherent leftism can only resonate in the hearts and minds of mestizos that not only never really assimilated into Western culture in any significant sense, but also lost touch with their ancestral, native American heritage.

Mestizo culture, if it can be called that, is an incoherent melange. A confusing patchwork born of the delusional attempt to embrace “diversity as strength” at the core of Latin American national projects. Most of them, to add insult to injury, suffused with the feverish dream of a supranational Patria Grande.

This essential lack of cultural substance of the Latin American mestizo is, of course, the main reason why most of them, even in 21st-century Latin America, live in a state that cannot be characterized as anything but plain savagery.

Actually, perhaps it wouldn’t be inaccurate to say that in some respects, life in the barrios and favelas of Latin American megalopolises is today more savage than it was for their jungle-dwelling ancestors.

Can anyone in their right minds expect anything else than leftism, the anti-civilizational ideology par-excellence, to become hegemonic among a fundamentally savage people?

Can anyone in their right minds even insinuate that the deepest, gut-level political instincts of working class Americans and Europeans are in any way as susceptible to leftism as the mostly mestizo common folk in Latin America are?

Also, as Stevens points out elsewhere:

[Rightist] societies are neither individualist nor collectivist, but organic. They are people cooperating at a level of such maturity that each person finds a role they can serve and stays there. If that’s king, great; if it’s peasant, ditto.

Crass attempts to impose the notion of individual autonomy at the core of classical liberalism on uncultured peoples like those of Latin America, inevitably result in full-blown collectivist regimes that appeal to the savage impulses of the mestizo.

Given the actual state of affairs in the first world, the liberal notion of individual autonomy has seemingly proven to also exert a corroding influence on the spiritual values of Western culture that gave birth to it in the first place.

This led to the exacerbated, atomized, materialist individualism that Stevens describes. And ultimately, this seems to also be devolving into full-blown collectivism, albeit in form more akin to A Brave New World than 1984.

But if first-world liberals have their way and their open-border policies prevail, they will ultimately face a rude awakening.

When pervasive price controls and rampant nationalization of industry become the norm, the soma will run out, just like Venezuelans ran out of toilet paper, and they will realize they are living under the more 1984-ish version of collectivism that prevails in Latin America.

And it will be too late to do anything about it.

Turning the question around

Pundits and intellectuals across the ideological spectrum have long struggled with a seemingly unanswerable question about Argentina: How did Argentina go from first-world status in the beginning of the 20th century to third-world hellhole several decades later?’

And as a corollary: How did Argentina and the United States end up having such radically different levels of national success, given that both countries were blessed with large territories and rich natural-resource endowments?

So far, the typical conservative answer to the question has blamed bad government, i.e., the statist policies that became a staple of Argentine politics since the mid-20th century.

However, this begs the more fundamental question: Why did statism become the essential staple of Argentine politics?

What caused the widespread popular support and continued hegemony of those policies since Juan Domingo Peron irrupted in the political scene in the mid 40’s to the military juntas in the 70’s, all the way through until the return of democracy in the early 80’s and beyond?

As usual, the enigma starts to evaporate if one dares to ask yet another question, albeit of the politically incorrect kind: Were the Argentines that brought about the country’s early glory the same Argentines responsible for its decline?

History seems to indicate that the answer is a clear and resounding “no”:

Argentina became independent from Spain in 1816 just after Napoleos occupation of the Iberian Peninsula. After a period of struggle between caudillos, the country was unified with a constitution inspired, in part, by that of the United States. A generation of brilliant thinkers led by Juan Bautista Alberdi and Domingo Faustino Sarmiento saw European immigration as the key to modernity, and this was enshrined in Article 25: “The Federal Government will encourage European immigration; and may not restrict, limit nor tax in any way the entrance into Argentine territory of those foreigners, who have the purpose of working the land, improving industries, and introducing and teaching sciences and arts.”

In those days, many thought Argentina was called to be the United States of the south. By 1914, it had the sixth highest GDP in the world. Thanks to immigration, it went from a population of 800,000—mostly mestizos—in 1852, to 8 million in 1914. Eighty-five percent were white, and most of the remaining 15 percent were light-skinned mestizos, completely assimilated to Western culture. The concept of multiculturalism did not exist. Buenos Aires became known as the Paris of South America, with wide avenues, mansions, palaces, theaters, museums, schools, excellent universities, and renowned scholars and researchers.

In 1913, the Argentine GDP was almost as great as that of the rest of South America combined. Per capita income was 50 percent higher than in Italy, 85 percent higher than in Spain and Norway, 170 percent higher than in Japan, and more than 4 times greater than that of Brazil. Our Armed Forces were the most powerful, well equipped, and best trained in South America. The Military College of the Nation, where army officers are still educated, was at a level that rivaled that of West Point.

Very little is left today of that Argentina. It began to fade during the Great Depression in the 1930s. Many historians blame the closing of international markets after the Wall Street Crash—that was certainly a factor—but there was another cause: European immigration stopped. Instead, there was migration of Mestizos and Amerindians, both from the country to the city and from neighboring Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, and Chile. These new arrivals were prolific and ringed the main cities—Buenos Aires, Rosario, Cordoba, Mendoza—with belts of poverty. Unlike the Europeans, whose arrival was planned and encouraged, Amerindian migration was uncontrolled. White Argentina looked the other way.

With no European immigration, Paraguayans became the largest foreign community, followed by Bolivians, Peruvians, and Chileans. During the 1990s, Paraguayan immigration increased by 30 percent, and during the same decade, Peruvian immigration increased fourfold, from 16,000 to 88,000 per year. Between 1980 and 2001, Bolivian immigration grew 62.3 percent.

Official figures show that by 2001 there were around one million foreigners of Latin American origin [1]—about 3 percent of the population—but this figure is not reliable, since it reflects only legal immigrants. Nor is there any information about second, third, and fourth generations of arrivals since 1930. Argentina now has an underclass of people essentially outside the system, with unreliable housing, no sewers or clean water, bad food and health care, and few clothes. According to Argentine Catholic University’s Social Observatory, 4.5 million people were living in such conditions of extreme poverty in 2016. That was 10 percent of population; 60 percent of them are probably foreign born, with the other 40 percent mostly second- and third-generation foreigners.

In 2004, the socialist government of Nestor Kirchner passed a new migration law, implementing what was known as the “Patria Grande” (Big Homeland) program. This included amnesty for all illegals, as well as a relaxation of income requirements for immigrants. It also guaranteed free access to public education at all levels, free medical care, family reunification, elimination of the obligation for public officials to report illegal immigrants, issuance of residence permits with only a sworn statement rather than proof of income, and voting rights in local elections. These measures were clearly meant to win votes from non-whites.

A 2005 executive order went further, granting residency to anyone who simply declares he is a relative of either an Argentine or a permanent resident. In just a few months, the Patria Grande program added 442,000 legal residents to the population, and encouraged many more to immigrate illegally. This was done without any consideration for how these people would be housed, what jobs they would take, what taxes they could pay, or what schools and hospitals they would use.

In light of immigration over the last 80 years, my own calculation is that 18 million inhabitants—nearly 40 percent of the population—are not white. There are very few genetic studies, but the foremost one [2] comes close to confirming my estimate. The results probably inflate the figure for whites, with an estimate of 65 percent. The estimate for Mestizos or Amerindians is 31 percent, and for Africans, 4 percent. It is undeniable that Argentina has declined; I believe it is at least in part a consequence of the decline in the number of whites.

The white middle class pays taxes for public schools but almost never uses them, preferring to pay a second time for private schools. Many whites also avoid public hospitals because of poor treatment. Absurdly, tourism agencies organize “medical tours” to bring sick foreigners to Buenos Aires, where they enjoy free treatment of a quality not found in their own countries. Just two months ago, a senator complained to the media that a major hospital was fully booked for an entire month by people coming from Paraguay.

Culture, music, food, and other customs are changing. Tango and Argentine Rock are being replaced by Cumbia and other foreign rhythms.

Most non-whites live in poor neighborhoods, which shade imperceptibly into shanty towns and slums. There are no streets; just passages too narrow for an automobile. This is a perfect environment for hiding criminals, for drug trafficking, and for child lookouts who warn when strangers—especially the police—enter the area…

Eighteen million people get a social welfare check from the government each month, and 50 percent of the labor force is in the public sector. A small number of taxpayers must support all these people. Unemployment is over 10 percent and the poverty rate is 33 percent. Poverty, moreover, is at a Third-World level of misery—not the relatively comfortable “poverty” of the United States. Unlike Europeans, Amerindians and Mestizo rarely achieve upward mobility, even after decades in the country. The enormous sums spent on public schools seem to make little difference.

And as far as these questions go, perhaps the most relevant thing to do is turning some of them around: Will the American people wake up before it is too late for their country to avoid Argentina’s fate?

In 30 years, a good migration policy transformed Argentina into one of the best places on earth. From 1880 to 1910, six million Europeans chose to come to my country rather than to the United States. Later, a bad migration policy—or the absence of any policy at all—drove the same country towards fragmentation and chaos. The decline accelerated between 1990 and 2017.

In both North and South America, Hispanics are pushing relentlessly towards the higher latitudes. You Americans still have a Hispanic population that is only 17 percent of the total, a figure we reached in the 1970s. Argentina is a mirror that shows what your country will be like when that figure reaches 40 percent.

Economic illiteracy is not a government monopoly in Venezuela

Sure enough, the world has good reasons to be concerned about the latest lunacy of Venezuela’s socialist government, The War on Bread:

Facing a bread shortage that is spawning massive lines and souring the national mood, the Venezuelan government is responding this week by detaining bakers and seizing establishments.

In a press release, the National Superintendent for the Defense of Socioeconomic Rights said it had charged four people and temporarily seized two bakeries as the socialist administration accused bakers of being part of a broad “economic war” aimed at destabilizing the country.

In a statement, the government said the bakers had been selling underweight bread and were using price-regulated flour to illegally make specialty items, like sweet rolls and croissants.

The government said bakeries are only allowed to produce French bread and white loaves, or pan canilla, with government-imported flour. However, in a tweet on Thursday, price control czar William Contreras said only 90 percent of baked goods had to be price-controlled products.

But sadly, crass economic illiteracy apparently isn’t confined to government officials in Venezuela:

As a price control obsessive, I always finding it disappointing when opposition politicians won’t call a spade a spade and demand they end at once. After all, price controls may well win the hotly contested battle for the title of Most Destructive Policy of Bolivarian Socialism.

But yesterday I was left in complete shock when I heard an important opposition politician call for more price controls!

In a now sadly infamous statement, José Manuel Olivares, the National Assembly member for Primero Justicia who chairs the Health Subcommittee, said the National Assembly should push for price controls over medical consultations in private health centers, adding: “it is not a regulation meant to destroy, let’s not forget that the private sector, with 8,000 beds, caters to 55% of Venezuelans.”

…we still have opposition politicians who think if your intention isn’t to destroy something, then a destructive policy won’t destroy it. ¡Por favor!

This is, of course, a perfect example of why culture matters.

In cultures where liberty is a sacred value, price controls and other crass interventions in the marketplace are anathema.

Politicians themselves are part of that culture, and are basically aware of those policies’ self-defeating consequences.

Also, the sacredness of liberty means the people are ready to rise up in arms against politicians who might happen to loose that basic awareness.

But in Venezuela, as in much of the third world, no one will be much dismayed when a politician declares that the solution to the problems created by policies that by far have created the most destruction throughout the history of mankind… is more of those very same policies!

The politically correct will never admit it. But this is a perfect example of a people who simply have not reached a level of cultural evolution that is suitable for civilization.

The lesson for America is very simple: if you let a massive inflow of people from these cultures into your country, you can very much expect them to tolerate, and eventually to demand, such policies.

It’s not like American ideals will magically enter the deep psyches of people from utterly undeveloped cultures by osmosis as soon as they cross the border.

And once they become a large enough share of the population, there surely won’t be a lack of politicians willing to offer them what they want in exchange for votes.

Failing to see that, is simply failing to see why real American conservatives who voted for Trump are damn right to build that yuuuuge, beautiful wall.

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